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Summary 
The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), which governs 
relations between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
group and the European Union (EU), will expire in the year 2020. 
While the three pillars of this framework addressing political 
dialogue, development cooperation and trade are generally 
considered to have served their purpose well, there are clear 
signs that significant changes within the ACP group, the EU 
and the wider international landscape demand a different 
articulation of the relationship. 
A tacit understanding among Europeans is that the ball is in the 
ACP’s corner in terms of defining and determining their own 
future as a group and its relationship vis-à-vis the EU as such. 
However, a momentum needs to be built for the coming 2015 
revision of the Cotonou Agreement with a view to a plausible 
post-2020 scenario, in which the EU also needs to set out its 
own desires and priorities in giving shape to the cooperation. In 
previous years the EU Member States increasingly “outsourced” 
the management of the partnership to the European Com-
mission, but there is a gradually growing recognition that the 
CPA is presently the principal functioning vehicle guiding EU-
Africa relations.  
European perceptions on the future of the Cotonou Agree-
ment point to two sets of arguments, namely: 
Reasons to do away with the ACP-EU partnership: 
− Weak rationale to keep a common framework with these 
very different regions, combined with weak evidence of 
the development of an ACP identity or intra-ACP trade; 
− Decreasing relevance of ex-colonial ties, particularly in the 
context of an enlarged EU, but also more generally of the 
agreement’s strong focus on official development assis-
tance; 
− Poor track record in shaping joint positions and interventions 
at international fora. 
Elements in the partnership deemed worth preserving: 
− Legally binding nature that favours political dialogue as 
well as predictability and strategy ownership in develop-
ment cooperation; 
− A relatively strong performance of the European Devel-
opment Fund (EDF) compared to other EU development 
cooperation instruments, combined with its multi-stake-
holder approach to the design and management of de-
velopment strategies; 
− Potential alliance for global public goods provision. 
Despite the fact that there is not yet an official position from 
the EU nor its Member States on what should happen after 
the CPA expires, European actors (European Commission, 
European Parliament, Member States) seem to be inclined to 
move towards a more regional approach of the Union’s 
external relations while maintaining the valuable aspects of 
the present setup. While the EU’s declining strategic interest 
in the Caribbean – and especially the Pacific – is no secret, 
too rejectionist a stance towards the cooperation framework 
by EU Member States could seriously harm the promotion of 
their values and interests in Africa. 
The EU would currently seem most inclined to preserve key 
elements of the CPA in a “light version” of the current ACP-EU 
agreement, by transferring those elements into separate EU 
regional strategies towards Africa, the Caribbean and the 
Pacific, or a combination of both. European policy discussions 
on this matter are also long overdue, given that the pre-
parations for the third revision of the CPA in 2015 will be a key 
“warming-up session” for the negotiations for post-2020. The 
EPA negotiations have seriously and negatively affected ACP-
EU relations in the recent past and could also harm the EU’s 
own position and trade with Africa in the medium- to long 
term if continued in the same manner. 
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Questioning a long-standing relationship 
With its upcoming expiration in 2020, the Cotonou Part-
nership Agreement, which regulates the relationship be-
tween the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific group of countries 
and the European Union, is in need of rethinking. Although 
it is too early to have consolidated official positions on the 
future of ACP-EU relations and of the CPA beyond 2020, 
stakeholders are entering, in the coming months and years, 
a crucial stage of internal debate and negotiating on possi-
ble scenarios. 
Ever since the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1953, 
which “associated” the Overseas Countries and Territories 
to the European Economic Community, the EU has had a 
formal and privileged cooperation framework for its rela-
tionship with countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the 
Pacific. The ACP group, which its members created in 
1972, today includes 80 countries, and since 2000 its 
cooperation with the EU is governed through the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement. The new agreement builds upon 
the spirit and acquis of the previous Lomé conventions and 
lasts until 2020. At the core of the agreement lies the 
objective of “reducing and eventually eradicating poverty, 
consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and 
the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world 
economy” (Art. 1). To reach this ultimate goal, the CPA 
focusses on three complimentary dimensions: political 
dialogue, economic and trade cooperation, and develop-
ment cooperation. This unique configuration makes the 
CPA the most comprehensive North-South partnership, all 
the more because it involves both state- and non-state 
actors. 
Currently, European circles display a combination of a 
moderately positive assessment and apparent signs of 
disinterest in the status quo of the relationship. Despite 
the high ambitions of the partnership and the comprehen-
sive and legally binding nature of the CPA, current Europe-
an perceptions coincide that key aspects of the partnership 
have been underused in the past 12 years of implementa-
tion and progress is generally deemed to have been made 
slowly. It is thought the partnership has also been influen-
tial in giving direction to the EU’s overall development 
policy and its cooperation with other regions, as well as 
containing elements such as joint-programming and joint-
accountability structures that represent a Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness avant la lettre.  
Changes within the EU itself, and particularly the latest 
enlargement rounds, have been reflected in the increasing 
geopolitical priority given to the Eastern European Neigh-
bourhood, while current developments in the Arab world 
have attracted increased attention. The EU’s shift to more 
regional or continental approaches in dealing with the 
ACP’s individual components – Africa, the Caribbean and 
the Pacific – and the ongoing negotiations on Economic 
Partnership Agreements for most ACP regions further urge 
stakeholders to reflect on how post-2020 ACP-EU relations 
may look. Meanwhile, discussions are ongoing on a new 
“deadline” for the completion of the negotiations on Eco-
nomic Partnership Agreements, which have seriously 
strained ACP-EU relations recently. A continued dogmatic 
and inflexible management of these negotiations by the 
EU – in stark contrast to more pragmatic approaches to 
economic cooperation with Africa, as practiced by the 
United States and emerging countries – is not in the inter-
est of either side of the partnership.  
EU perceptions on the ACP-EU framework 
There is a growing awareness about possible future chang-
es in the privileged relationship on both sides of the part-
nership. On the side of the EU, a joint informal work- 
ing group has been created by the European External  
Action Service and the European Commission (through  
its Directorate General Development and Cooperation –  
EuropeAid) to reflect on prospects for future cooperation. 
Interviews conducted with European officials allow us to 
identify a number of critical issues on which consensus 
seems to be emerging.
Reasons for EU stakeholders not to extend the Cotonou 
Agreement beyond 2020: 
ACP / CPA rationale. European stakeholders tend to per-
ceive the ACP as a rather loose grouping of countries that 
no longer has the same relevance nor presents common 
interests when compared to the past. Many interlocutors 
from Member States that joined the EU in the past decades 
perceive the framework as a historical relic. The prevalent 
view sees little evidence of a so-called ACP identity, or of 
common interests within the group – apart from a shared 
reliance on resources from the EDF and trade preferences 
(notably the Everything But Arms policy). The three re-
gional components of the agreement, namely Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific, are often considered too diver-
gent to be effectively addressed through one and the same 
framework. The changing global landscape, the growing 
role of BRICS in ACP countries and the recent growth per-
formance of resource-rich African countries have amplified 
these differences. The widespread belief is that intra-ACP 
cooperation has been poor, precisely because of these 
divergences in economic assets and interests. 
Development cooperation. There is a widespread sense 
within the EU that working with the ACP group is no long-
er the best way to address current challenges in develop-
ment politics. Whereas the overall narrative in develop-
ment cooperation is moving away from a rationale based 
on the mere provision of official development assistance, 
work within the ACP framework is generally deemed to 
remain constrained by a donor-recipient reasoning. This is 
increasingly being brought into question, given the eco-
nomic growth currently being experienced by many coun-
tries within the ACP. Therefore, there is a widespread per-
ception among European officials that in ACP capitals, the 
CPA is viewed basically as a channel to secure funding. 
Accordingly, the perception exists that the current ACP 
actors would be willing to accept a different framework, 
provided it secures similar advantages. Some EU interlocu-
tors expect that Brussels-based ACP actors would oppose 
any real change to the ACP-EU partnership if there were 
not enough guarantees to maintain a similarly privileged 
treatment by the EU. In reality, however, EDF funds do not 
account in general for a large proportion of ACP govern-
ments’ expenditure, as shown in Figure 1, which compares 
EDF disbursements in 2009 to available ACP government 
expenditure. The figure shows that EDF funds are particu-
larly low in the Caribbean and Pacific regions, where this 
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ratio is 0.43 per cent and 0.25 per cent, respectively. 
Whereas for the ACP on average the ratio is 2.8 per cent, in 
Africa EDF funds represent on average 4.23 per cent, or 
5.22 per cent when only countries with direct EDF dis-
bursement different from zero are considered. 
Joint institutions. Concerning the ACP and joint ACP-EU 
institutions, EU stakeholders overall express critical views 
about the Centre for the Development of Enterprise, 
whereas the Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural 
Development is more positively assessed as regards its role 
in information provision and cross-fertilisation on agricul-
tural issues – albeit with a limited reach. The Joint Parlia-
mentary Assembly (JPA) is looked upon ambivalently. On 
the one hand, European officials generally believe it to be a 
useful forum to strengthen political dialogue while pro-
moting parliamentary values of democratic scrutiny and 
oversight. Also, the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly 
is deemed to play a key democratic role in scrutinising 
regional and country strategies as they are discussed within 
the assembly – although with no follow-up, theoretically 
allowing for ACP national MPs to be part of the debate and 
bring it to their own parliaments. Nevertheless, while rec-
ognising that the impact of the JPA is hard to assess, many 
also question whether one could maintain an expensive 
and time-consuming structure such as the JPA for the sole 
purpose of interesting discussions, especially in view of the 
rather low attendance levels by MEPs. In this regard, Euro-
pean Parliament officials are an exception, as they tend to 
deem the role of the JPA very positively. 
Elements of the partnership that EU stakeholders 
consider to be worth preserving: 
Legal nature and political dialogue. Concerning other 
elements of the approach to cooperation that may be 
considered worth preserving, EU actors almost unanimous-
ly agree that the legally binding nature of the partnership is 
the most valuable aspect of the CPA and that this should 
be preserved in any future configuration of ACP-EU rela-
tions. Compared to other development instruments, this 
is where its possible added value lays. To EU policy makers, 
the legal framework of the Cotonou Agreement is often 
the first thing they reach for when dealing with an ACP 
country. However, there is the view among some EU offi-
cials with experience in delegations and embassies that 
both political dialogue and development cooperation in 
partner countries did not depend on their legal framework 
and would remain unaffected were the legal character of 
the framework to disappear. In this regard, the existence of 
fruitful political dialogues with a number of non-ACP 
countries and of failed ones with signatories of the Coto-
nou Agreement would appear to substantiate this notion. 
Political dialogue on key areas such as migration, human 
rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance are 
among the other elements of an acquis that is generally 
perceived as worth preserving. 
Strong development cooperation track record. A quite 
extended understanding among EU officials is that the CPA 
could potentially facilitate a higher degree of ownership 
and a stronger spirit of partnership due to its contractual 
nature and the need for mutual agreement between the 
EU and ACP on issues such as sanctions or strategies. Addi-
tionally, many consider the EDF as a useful instrument for 
the Commission to work with because it allows stable and 
predictable funding – an important factor for the effective 
and efficient use of aid resources. Yet others voice their 
frustration at what they see as a negative effect of this, 
namely the power yielded by partner countries’ authorities 
in the selection of projects and programmes, which is often 
conducive to inefficient allocation and a barrier to further 
collaboration with local civil society organisations. Overall, 
ownership by and joint programming with partner coun-
tries, although seen as positive in their purpose, seem to 
pose significant challenges in practice, mostly due to the 
complex and hierarchical procedures of the EDF.  
Global public goods provision. A point that is recurrent 
among EU stakeholders is that if the ACP were to be able 
to come together and agree with the EU on issues of global 
public goods provision in international forums, then the 
CPA would have an added value for the EU, given the ACP’s 
large number of votes. However, the general perception 
seems to be that this is highly unlikely, as past experience 
has shown very limited cooperation in this regard. In fact, it 
is often pointed out that in such international meetings, 
the EU and ACP positions were more often than not con-
tradictory. An exception is, however, the recent United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development held in 
Rio de Janeiro in June 2012 (Rio+20), where the ACP group 
and the EU presented a common proposal that happened 
to be negotiated a week earlier during their joint ministerial 
meeting in Vanuatu. 
Civil society involvement. The Cotonou Working Group 
of the European NGO Confederation for Relief and Devel-
opment also stresses that the agreement is matched no-
where in terms of its fundamental principles and spirit of 
cooperation. The Working Group further stresses the dan-
ger of marginalisation of Cotonou and particularly pleads 
for a better use of the agreement’s 12th Article, which 
allows the ACP to enter into dialogue on EU policies that 
may affect their development. 
Figure 1: 2009 EDF disbursements as a percentage of  
government expenditures (countries (=Cs) 
with missing data excluded) 
Sources:  European Commission; IMF World Economic  
Outlook Database; own calculations. 
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Looking ahead: What future for ACP-EU coopera-
tion? 
There is growing consensus among EU stakeholders that  
post-2020 “business as usual” is untenable. The predominant 
feeling among European actors is that neither Cotonou nor, 
possibly, the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) group itself 
would continue to exist in their current format after 2020. In 
general, a shift from the ACP-EU framework towards indi-
vidual regional partnerships is envisaged as a natural and  
likely way forward. This option was also one of several 
scenarios explored in a study commissioned by the ACP 
Secretariat and funded by the United Nations Development 
Programme, but other scenarios that argued for a con-
solidation of the ACP group were reportedly preferred by the 
ACP Secretariat staff and ACP ambassadors. 
Whereas EU views appear to show a preference for the 
regionalisation scenario, whereby key elements of Cotonou’s 
acquis would be transposed to partnerships with Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific, they generally emphasise one key 
caveat, namely that the legal character of the political dialogue 
and development finance is safeguarded, something which 
may not be straightforward. It would appear there is also a 
consensus that such an outcome is only feasible after 2020, 
although – as per the agreement’s provisions – it should be 
discussed and reached before that year.  
Recommendations 
While it is too early to have consolidated views on post-
2020 ACP-EU cooperation, there seems to be considerable 
consensus about the need to critically assess the added 
value of the CPA in view of its expiry and possible revision 
in 2015. Such an assessment would require considerable 
time and investment and would have to start soon. The 
overarching issue in this revision would be the objective to 
move ACP-EU cooperation beyond the traditional donor-
recipient relationship. EU stakeholders find that preserving 
the status quo is not an option after 2020, and in view of 
wider discussions on the future of development coopera-
tion after 2015, it is now up to both parties to define what 
elements of the partnership they deem to be most valuable 
and worth preserving. This requires a detailed and evi-
dence-based reflection on past results and the potential of 
the partnership before jumping straight into discussing 
specific scenarios. The ball is thus in both camps, and if the 
EU takes its privileged partner seriously, it will facilitate – 
and more actively participate in – further reflections on the 
topic during the coming months. 
This briefing note has been written in the context of a joint research project by the European Centre for Development Policy  
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